Whereas more than three centuries of Spanish rule had failed to subdue the Muslim population - Moros - in the Philippine South, 48 years (1898-1946) of American administration set in motion the gradual subjugation of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. This was achieved through a four-pronged strategy, of direct military intervention (superior weaponry); internal colonisation (e.g. systematic transfer of surplus population from the North to the sparsely populated but resource-rich South); large-scale corporate investment and the creation/instrumentalisation of a basically Manila-centered (Christian) bureaucracy. Since independence (1946) these processes have accelerated under the North-Filipino landed élite. Its shift in development strategy and emphasis on export-orientation and closer world market integration facilitated this group's iron-handed actions aimed at preserving its interests in close alliance with dominating foreign - largely North American - powers. To uphold what was left of political self-determination, cultural identity and religious beliefs, the Moros resorted to armed resistance. The formation of the Moro National Liberation Front, ›MNLF‹ (1971) led the Marcos régime to proclaim martial law in autumn 1972. The stage was set for an escalating war that so far has left well over 70,000 people dead. From its very start the Philippine state maintained that the "forgotten" war be conducted on religious grounds, for this allowed the government to present itself as an arbiter of disputes between two religious communities, thus concealing the politico-economic content of the conflict. The author closely examines the roots and early developments of the MNLF. Taking into consideration the relevant data and sources of all participants and having interviewed several MNLF cadres in the late seventies he then concentrates on the organisation's intrinsic difficulties to define a clear-cut theoretical framework for and practical pursuit of self-determination. Ironically, lingering ethnic, politico-economic and cultural differences among the Moros were even reflected in the MNLF leadership. It frequently shifted from autonomy to secession and vice versa. Being more of a military organisation, a successive decentralisation of the MNLF's command structures - partially due to its Libyan connection - made it difficult to sustain its cohesion. Political unity within the leadership became precarious. Various MNLF cadres had persisted in their different ethnic and political allegiances, and splits within the Central Committee - e.g. between Nur Misuari and Abul Khayr Alonto, Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively - were brewing. Marcos was well aware of these developments. Temporarily decreasing military pressure, he offered as bait a political settlement based on regional autonomy which in his view was likely to bring dissensions into the open. In this context, the Islamic Conference (IC) was granted an opportunity to exercise its moderating influence. It had distanced itself from the MNLF's maximalist aspirations to sovereignty and kept a studied silence regarding the MNLF claim that the Moros were faced with genocide. A compromise, in form of the Tripolis Agreement (Dec. 23, 1976) with its ceasefire provision, was short-lived. As he had anticipated, Marcos gained more from it than he could ever have achieved on the battlefield. Internal strife within the MNLF sharpened. The "radical" faction under Nur Misuari was not opposed to strike a tactical alliance with the growing New People's Army (NPA) in order to break through the chronic political isolation of the MNLF, thus contributing to a partial secularisation of the Muslim movement. This, on the other hand, substantially narrowed the "moderates'" room to manoeuver. They surrendered or otherwise slipped under Manila's wings, a move which brought the IC and Marcos closer to each other than ever before. Above all, both are anxious not to let a "local conflict" spill over, potentially to endanger regional stability. Nor can and will they be accomodative to a far-reaching secularisation and finally radicalisation of the Moro struggle which, for "reasons of security", in the eyes of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Washington are likewise not to be tolerated.